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Abstract:  
When shareholders of a target firm expect a value improving takeover to be successful, they are 
individually better off not tendering their shares to the buyer and the takeover potentially fails. 
Squeeze-out procedures can overcome this free-riding dilemma by allowing a buyer to enforce a 
payout of minority shareholders and seize complete control of the target firm. However, it is often 
argued that shareholder protection laws and litigation restore or intensify the free-riding dilemma. 
Applying a game theoretic setting, we demonstrate that it is not shareholder litigation that brings 
back the free-riding dilemma, but rather the strategic gambling of buyers for lower prices and flaws 
in the design and application of squeeze-out laws. We find, for example, that lawmakers should 
refrain from setting separate legal thresholds for corporate control and squeeze-outs. We also 
analyze a favorable change in jurisdiction of the German Federal Court and provide implications for 
legal policy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly accepted that takeovers of firms play a crucial role in the economy. Given 
effective competition, successful takeovers accelerate the restructuring and rightsizing of 
formerly weak and cost inefficient target firms. Through the acquisition, buyers are able to 
realize synergies in production and economies of scope and scale. Furthermore, takeovers 
often lead to the replacement of the previous management, and this ideally favors change 
and a quicker adjustment to the market situation (see, among others, YARROW 1985, 
SCHERER 1988, HOLMSTRÖM and NALEBUFF 1992).1  
 Despite these desirable features, successful takeovers may be impeded due to an 
underlying free-riding problem among shareholders. GROSSMAN and HART (1980) advanced 
the insight that shareholders will reject the tender offer from the buyer when they expect 
the takeover to be successful and value improving. Given that the other shareholders 
tender, holding out and keeping the shares will enable minority shareholders to participate 
in the takeover gains as stock prices increase. It is thus individually profitable to free-ride 
on the buyer’s improvement of the firm, leading to a possible failure of the takeover as the 
buyer may not collect enough shares to assume control of the target.  
 In order to facilitate takeovers, legislators have introduced squeeze-out procedures 
into national corporate laws (e.g., United States Delaware law, European Directive 
                                                 
1 In this perspective, one could regard takeovers as a part of SCHUMPETER´s ‘creative destruction’ (see 
SCHUMPETER 1947, pp.113). Though takeovers may also show undesirable consequences, such as reduced 
competition and market power (see SCHERER 1988 for an overview), this is not the focus of our paper. 
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2004/25/EC, German § 327 AktG). In principle, squeeze-out procedures enable a buyer who 
collects the majority of the shares to pay out all remaining minority shareholders and 
assume complete control. Under this legal mechanism, shareholders are now incentivized 
(or coerced) into accepting the tender offer right from the beginning, as holding out only 
results in the forced pay out. Squeeze-out procedures thus basically solve the free-riding 
problem (see YARROW 1985). However, squeeze-outs also enable the buyer to seize the 
complete gains of the takeover and force shareholders out of their investments. Most 
countries thus enacted specific shareholder protection laws. Standard legal remedies for 
shareholders include the right to appeal the squeeze-out, i.e. enforce a verification of its 
legitimacy, and the judicial review on the fairness of the offered payout price. Several 
scholars claim that such shareholder litigation effectively restores the free-riding problem 
and thus frustrates the underlying incentive mechanism of squeeze-out procedures (see, 
e.g., MUELLER and PANUNZI 2004 and BURKART and LEE 2018). 
 In this paper we show that such shareholder protection rights and shareholder 
litigation induce a redistribution of takeover gains, as intended by the legislator, and do not 
impede efficient takeovers or sizeable rents for the acquirer per se. Applying a game 
theoretic setting in the tradition of GROSSMAN and HART (1980) and BEBCHUCK (1989), we 
demonstrate that it is not shareholder litigation that restores the free-riding dilemma, but 
the strategic gambling of buyers for lower prices and flaws in the design of squeeze-out laws 
and judicial review.  
 The paper is organized as follows: chapter 2 provides an overview of related 
literature and chapter 3 introduces the institutional background of squeeze-out procedures 
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and shareholder protection laws. Chapter 4 describes the stylized takeover game and derives 
first theoretic results. We analyze the specific impact of a change in jurisdiction on the 
economics of squeeze-outs, as exemplified by the German Federal Court in 2010, in 
chapter 5. We discuss our findings in chapter 6, and chapter 7 concludes. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
Our paper extends the literature on takeovers, squeeze-outs and shareholder litigation. 
Following the seminal work by GROSSMAN and HART (1980) on the fundamental free-rider 
problem in takeovers, literature has addressed various possible solutions and aspects of the 
dilemma, allowing for, among others, mixed strategies of shareholders in the tendering 
decision (e.g., BEBCHUK 1989 and HIRSHLEIFER and TITMAN 1990), a finite number of 
shareholders or large initial shareholdings (e.g., SHLEIFER and VISHNY 1986, BAGNOLI and 
LIPMANN 1988, HOLMSTRÖM and NALEBUFF 1992, and AMIHUD et al. 2004), post-takeover 
moral hazard by the buyer (e.g., BURKART, GROMB, and PANUNZI 1998), and share trading 
and arbitrage during the tender offer period (e.g., KYLE and VILA 1991, CORNELLI and LI 2002, 
and GOMES 2012). 
A number of authors have pointed out that squeeze-out rules can offer a simple way 
to overcome the free-rider problem.2 YARROW (1985) shows this for bids that are 
conditional upon the buyer collecting enough shares to satisfy the required threshold for 
                                                 
2 In their conclusion, GROSSMAN and HART (1980) already note that a second step merger or liquidation of the 
target firm is a common ‘exclusionary device’ (a mechanism that excludes minority shareholders from a part 
of the takeover gain, thus resolving the free-riding dilemma) in practice. 
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conducting a squeeze-out. BURKART and PANUNZI (2003) examine dual takeover thresholds, 
requiring fifty percent of shares for control and a higher threshold, such as ninety percent 
of shares, for the right to conduct a squeeze-out and assume complete control of the target 
company. They find that takeover offers at a price lower than the post-takeover share value 
can be successful if the tender offer is made conditional upon the buyer obtaining enough 
shares to reach the squeeze-out threshold. AMIHUD et al. (2003) propose a rule for setting 
the pay-off in squeeze-outs at the higher of the pre-bid market price and tender offer price. 
They contend that such a rule enables value-enhancing takeovers in the basic GROSSMAN 
and HART setting as well as in modifications, allowing for large shareholdings, asymmetric 
information in relation to the post-takeover value of the firm, post-takeover moral hazard 
and risk arbitrage. Their work also considers the effects of principle shareholder remedies 
against a squeeze-out (i.e. appraisal rights and breach of fiduciary duty claims), finding that 
these do not alter the basic outcome. 
Other authors argue that squeeze-out rules are (at best) ineffectual in a takeover, 
because shareholder protection laws and litigation restore or even intensify the basic free-
rider problem. Focusing on how a merger with an indebted buyer can overcome the free-
rider problem, MUELLER and PANUNZI (2004) extend the original GROSSMAN and HART 
framework for squeeze-outs and shareholder litigation. In their setting, non-tendering is a 
dominant strategy, as shareholders who do not tender their shares either receive the tender 
offer price, or a higher post-takeover share value awarded to them by the court. MUELLER 
and PANUNZI thus conclude that shareholder litigation reinstates the free-rider problem ‘in 
full force’ (p. 28). BURKART and LEE (2018) examine two-step takeovers and take into 
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account the possibility of a price revision in a subsequent legal challenge. They argue that 
the availability of a squeeze-out intensifies the free-rider problem because the possibility of 
a higher price in the squeeze-out will cause shareholders to hold out for a higher price 
already in the initial offer. BURKART and LEE conclude that a buyer “must offer a price (at 
least) equal to the post-freeze-out value to succeed with the initial offer” (p. 21).  
Taking different approaches, GOMES (2012) and DALKIR et al. (2018) show that the 
legal squeeze-out threshold plays an important part. GOMES (2012) studies takeovers in a 
dynamic environment, allowing for offer revisions and trading in target shares during the 
takeover. His analysis shows that, when a takeover is conditional upon the squeeze-out 
threshold, a part of the takeover gains is redistributed to the shareholders, because 
arbitrageurs can accumulate shareholdings that are large enough to hold out, forcing bidders 
to pre-emptively offer a higher price in the initial offer. He furthermore reasons that higher 
squeeze-out thresholds require higher offer prices, as less shares are required to veto the 
transaction, thus raising the bargaining power of arbitrageurs. Building on BAGNOLI and 
LIPMAN’S (1988) tender offer model with a finite number of shareholders, DALKIR et al. 
(2018) support the view that higher squeeze-out thresholds lower the buyer’s share of the 
takeover gains. They also demonstrate that a legal setting with dual thresholds restores the 
free-rider problem, as shareholders can be pivotal for the takeover. 
Our model is most closely related to the works of BEBCHUK (1989) who extends the 
GROSSMANN and HART setting for mixed strategies and BURKART and LEE (2018) who model 
a dynamic two-step tender offer and squeeze-out with an exogeneous probability of a price 
revision in a subsequent legal challenge. 
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3. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
Squeeze-out procedures facilitate takeovers by enabling a buyer who collects the majority 
of shares in a target company to pay out all remaining shareholders and assume complete 
control. Many national legislators have introduced squeeze-out regulations within their 
jurisdictions resulting in a variety of rules regarding required thresholds for squeeze-outs, 
provisions on fair price and shareholder remedies. 
 Under United States Delaware law3 a squeeze-out of minority shareholders in a 
public company generally can be structured as a ‘one-step’ statutory merger or as a ‘two-
step’ tender offer for control followed by a (short-form4) merger (KREBS 2012). In most U.S. 
states, including Delaware, a buyer can conduct a squeeze-out with a simple voting 
majority, i.e. often less than fifty percent of share capital5 (e.g., DALKIR et al. 2018, GOMES 
2012, KREBS 2012). Though not a general requirement, a larger shareholding can simplify 
the squeeze-out procedure by avoiding the need for shareholder approval (e.g., the ninety 
percent threshold in sec. 253a DGCL). 
                                                 
3 We limit the judicial analyses in the United States to Delaware law under which most U.S. companies are 
incorporated (AMIHUD et al. 2003, p. 22). 
4 Short-form mergers pursuant to sec. 253(a) DGCL or sec. 251(h) DGCL do not require shareholder approval 
and can be initiated if the buyer holds at least ninety percent of the target’s share capital (sec. 253a DGCL) or 
if the buyer holds a majority of the listed target’s share capital following a friendly tender offer for all of the 
target’s share capital and the merger consideration is the same as the tender offer consideration (sec. 251h 
DGCL). 
5 The corporate charter may specify otherwise (GOMES 2012, p. 1). 
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European legislation frequently requires buyers who have obtained a controlling 
shareholding in a target company to meet more demanding levels of shareholder acceptance 
in order to initiate a squeeze-out process.6 The European Directive 2004/25/EC (the 
Takeover Directive) grants buyers the right, following a tender offer, to squeeze-out 
minority shareholders at a ‘fair price’ if (1) the buyer holds a minimum of ninety percent7 
of the target’s share capital, or, (2) the buyer has acquired a minimum of ninety percent of 
the target’s share capital targeted in the preceding tender offer. European member states 
have adopted one or both conditions alongside (often more restrictive) national squeeze-
out regulations already in place. In Germany, for example, most squeeze-outs are conducted 
within the existing legal frameworks of § 327 AktG (German Stock Corporation Act) or 
§ 62 UmwG (German Transformation Act). Both squeeze-out procedures require a 
shareholders’ resolution with minimum acceptance levels of ninety-five percent (Stock 
Corporation Act) and ninety percent (Transformation Act). The German legislator has 
additionally adopted European Takeover Directive standards in § 39a-39c WpÜG (German 
Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act) with a minimum threshold of ninety-five percent 
of the target’s voting capital.8  
                                                 
6 See, e.g., KREBS 2012 or VENTORUZZO 2010 for a more detailed comparison of European and U.S. legislation 
on squeeze-outs. 
7 Member states may increase this threshold up to ninety-five percent (Art. 15, No. 2, DIRECTIVE 2004/25/EC). 
8 The Takeover Act squeeze-out is rarely employed in practice, possibly because of untested court procedures 
when the buyer fails to obtain the additional ninety percent majority of minorities condition (KREBS 2012, 
p. 971), or possibly because buyers seldom attain the required ninety-five percent threshold in the preceding 
voluntary or mandatory tender offer (Allen & Overy 2017, p. 21). 
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Thus, in the United States, a buyer who has collected a controlling shareholding in 
a target company can frequently assume complete control of the target in a squeeze-out, 
whereas in many European jurisdictions such as Germany the buyer is required to meet the 
more demanding dual thresholds for control and squeeze-out. 
 The buyer sets the price of the squeeze-out.9 In practice, the squeeze-out price often 
matches the price in the preceding tender offer (DALKIR et al. 2018), although this is not 
expressly required by U.S. takeover regulation or by the European Takeover Directive. In 
the United States, Delaware courts have established that tender offers by controlling 
shareholders are exempted from the more stringent entire fairness standard of judicial 
review, if the controlling shareholder guarantees a follow-on squeeze-out at the same price 
(SUBRAMANIAN 2005, p. 22). In Europe, the equal treatment principle of the Takeover 
Directive is understood to entail that the squeeze-out price may not be lower than the price 
offered in a preceding bid (KAISANLAHTI 2007). Correspondingly, the tender offer price is 
under certain conditions10 presumed to be fair for the purposes of a squeeze-out and thus 
unlikely to be subjected to extensive judicial review in shareholder litigation (VENTORUZZO 
2010, p. 893). 
                                                 
9 More precisely, in a U.S. statutory merger freezeout, the buyer will have to negotiate terms with the target 
company (SUBRAMANIAN 2005). 
10 The Takeover Directive provides that, in cases of a voluntary tender offer, the consideration offered in the 
tender offer is presumed to be fair where, through acceptance of the bid, the buyer has acquired shares 
representing not less than 90 percent of the capital carrying voting rights comprised in the bid. In cases of a 
mandatory tender offer, the consideration offered in the tender offer is unconditionally presumed to be fair 
(see Art. 15, Directive 2004/25/EC). 
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There is also no general legal requirement for the squeeze-out price to meet or 
exceed the market price of the target’s shares before the squeeze-out or before an earlier 
bid for control. However, in the United States, appraisal rights ensure that minority 
shareholders receive at least the pre-bid market price (AMIHUD et al. 2003, pp. 22-23). In 
Europe, corresponding regulations vary across national jurisdictions. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, the squeeze-out price may be lower than the pre-bid market price 
(KAISANHAHTI 2007, p. 503). In Germany, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) has previously 
held that the average share price during a reference period of three months before the day 
of the shareholder resolution that approves the squeeze-out sets the lower boundary for the 
calculation of adequate compensation in a squeeze-out pursuant to § 327 AktG (BGH II ZB 
15/00). A more recent court ruling by the BGH has moved the reference period to end at 
the (earlier) announcement date of the squeeze-out (BGH II ZB 18/09). 
 In both the United States and Europe almost all squeeze-outs are subject to 
shareholder litigation and are eventually settled in court (see, e.g., CAIN and SOLOMON 2014, 
or KRISHNAN et al. 2012 for the United States, and CROCI et al. 2017, or GEHLING et al. 2007 
for Europe). Standard legal remedies for shareholders include the right to appeal the 
squeeze-out, i.e. enforce a verification of its legitimacy, and the judicial review on the 
fairness of the offered payout price. The conditions regarding eligibility, awarding of 
compensation and delay of deal completion are dependent on the respective jurisdictional 
area (see, e.g., KAISANLAHTI 2007, KREBS 2012, RESTREPO and SUBRAMANIAN 2015 or 
VENTORUZZO 2010 for a more detailed review).  
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4. TAKEOVER MODEL WITH SQUEEZE-OUT LITIGATION 
Following the established methodology in the literature (see, among others, GROSSMAN and 
HART 1980, BEBCHUCK 1989), we apply a game-theoretic approach to analyze the impact of 
squeeze-out litigation on takeovers. 
4.1 Assumptions 
Consider a game of complete information with a unique Buyer B and N atomistic 
Shareholders iS  of a target firm with 1,..,i N , where N is large. The target firm has an 
ex-ante value of 0V , which means a per share value of 0 0V N v . The target is subject to a 
potential takeover, and a successful buyer may cut its operating costs by reorganizing 
production procedures or changing the firm´s current management. Thus, the firm value 
increases to 1V  (i.e., a value 1v  per share) if the takeover is successful. We assume 1 0V V , 
which implies that the takeover is socially desirable. All players are assumed to be risk-
neutral. 
In order to take over the target firm, the Buyer can make a public tender offer to 
shareholders with the tender price Tp  per share. All tender offers in this game are 
unconditional. The administration of this tendering process produces transaction costs BC  
for the Buyer. Shareholders tender X  shares to the Buyer, and the takeover is successful if 
X kN . Let 0 1k   specify the fraction of shares required for obtaining corporate control 
(e.g., fifty percent), If all shares are tendered, X N , the Buyer obtains complete control 
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of the target.11 We denote the private value of complete control as 2V  with 2 1V V  (or 
2 1v v  per share, respectively). Typically, we believe that complete control of a firm 
reduces transaction costs operating the target. If the post-takeover firm value equals the 
value of complete control, 2 1V V , then efficiency only requires successful takeovers. 
The Buyer may announce squeeze-out procedures after the takeover to assume 
complete control of the firm. Initially, we assume that the Buyer may squeeze-out minority 
shareholders whenever the takeover is successful, that is, whenever at least kN  shares are 
tendered.12 Then, minority shareholders must turn in the remaining shares, and receive a 
compensation Sp  per share from the Buyer. Squeeze-out procedures create additional 
transactions costs SC  for the Buyer. 
Courts enforce shareholder protection laws. We assume that minority shareholders 
may legally challenge the fairness of the cash compensation and move to court (which we 
designate ‘price fairness procedures’ in the following).13 In this case, court procedures last 
T  periods, and shareholders discount future payments with the interest rate r . 
                                                 
11 We distinguish between a situation where the buyer has a controlling shareholding, for example, through 
a majority of voting shares, and a situation we refer to as ‘complete control’, in which the buyer holds all of 
the shares in the target company. 
12 We relax this assumption and apply a higher squeeze-out threshold (frequently required in European 
jurisdictions) in the Annex A3. 
13 We use this broader term of price fairness to identify the general implications of judicial price review, a 
major feature of shareholder protection in most legal systems, in our game. We thus leave a closer look at 
specific legal remedies, such as entire fairness review or appraisal procedures, to the discussion. A second 
group of legal remedies is the legal challenge of the squeeze-out itself (‘action of avoidance’) which we also 
specify in the Annex A2. However, we find this legal remedy to be less restrictive for takeovers. 
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Eventually, the court decides in favor of the Buyer with probability [0,1] . We assume 
the allocation of legal fees under the American rule, i.e. each party bears its own litigation 
costs L . In order to evade court proceedings, the Buyer can make a take-it-or-leave-it 
settlement offer to litigating shareholders.  
The noncooperative takeover game consists of four stages as displayed in Fig. 1: The 
bid by the Buyer (Stage 1), the tendering process (Stage 2), the squeeze-out decision (Stage 
3) and shareholder litigation (Stage 4). 
The game begins with the Buyer who decides at stage 1 whether to make an offer to 
shareholders in order to take over the target firm. If a bid is made, shareholders may either 
accept the offered price and tender their shares or holdout and potentially benefit from 
higher share prices if the takeover is successful. If sufficient shares are tendered at stage 2, 
the takeover is successful and the Buyer may decide if he wants to squeeze-out the minority 
shareholders at stage 3. In case of a squeeze-out, the Buyer pays a compensation to the 
minority shareholders for collecting the remaining shares. Minority shareholders may 
accept this payout price, or move to court for price fairness procedures at stage 4. The court 
then decides the case in favor of the Buyer with the exogenous probability λ. 
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Figure 1. Extensive form of the takeover game. 
 
4.2 The Optimal Bid 
In this sequential takeover game with complete information, the Buyer makes a profit-
maximizing bid to take over the target. The optimal bid is determined via backward 
induction. 
At stage 4, the shareholder iS  considers the squeeze-out price Sp  of the Buyer. A 
rational shareholder will legally challenge the ‘fairness’ of the offer and litigate only if the 
expected outcome of court procedures 
4L
S  exceeds the offered price, 
4L
S Sp  . Note that 
such fairness procedures generally do not stall the squeeze-out itself, but only put the 
offered markup under judicial scrutiny. Thus, the litigating shareholder still receives the 
payment Sp , and pays the litigation costs L upfront. The litigating shareholder can expect  
 14 (1 )
(1 )
SL
S S T
v p
p L
r
 

 
  

    (1) 
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We stylize price fairness procedures as follows: if the court believes the shareholder to have 
a righteous claim, it will discard the squeeze-out price of the Buyer and determine the ‘fair’ 
compensation. As a proxy for ‘fairness’, the court considers the post-takeover value 1v .14 A 
pro-shareholder court ( 1  ) will then enforce higher compensations, while a pro-buyer 
court ( 1  )  will allow lower payments. The shareholders win fairness procedures with 
probability 1  , and receive the present value of the difference between the court-
determined ‘fair’ price and the offered price. We assume that this difference cannot be 
negative, that is, price fairness procedures cannot reduce the cash compensation to the 
shareholder.  
 At stage 3, the Buyer realizes that the takeover was successful and decides whether 
to squeeze-out minority shareholders and what price should be offered as compensation.15 
The Buyer anticipates that any squeeze-out price Sp  with 
4L
S Sp   will evade price 
fairness procedures with certainty, as shareholders are better off accepting the offer. Using 
(1), we thus find the minimum squeeze-out price to avoid litigation with 
                                                 
14 This is not always the case. For example, in appraisal proceedings under Delaware law, the court determines 
the fair value “exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the 
merger” (sec. 262h DGCL), i.e. a value that represents the pre-bid price 𝑣0. 
15 Note that the squeeze-out will only be a credible threat to tendering shareholders in order to overcome the 
free-riding problem of takeovers (stage 2), if and only if it is indeed in the interest of the Buyer at stage 3 to 
push for the squeeze-out when he learns that the takeover was successful. 
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(1 )
1
T
S MIN
r L
p v p


  

     (2)16 
Trivially, the squeeze-out price increases in the courts’ evaluation of a ‘fair’ stock price. It 
is also straightforward that litigation costs L 17, expected case disposition time T , time 
preference of shareholders r  and the probability of a success for the Buyer in court   
reduce the required minimum offer. It is also worth mentioning that in pro-shareholder 
courts ( 1  ), only positive litigation costs for shareholders allow a minimum offer below 
the post-takeover value, 1Sp v . 
 The Buyer, holding X kN  shares after the tender offer, will decide to squeeze-out 
remaining shareholders if the gained value from complete control exceeds the additional 
buy-out costs. Thus, a credible squeeze-out requires the condition 
2 1 ( ) S SV v X N X p C     to be fulfilled. Solved for Sp , the paid squeeze-out price that is 
profitable for the buyer cannot exceed MAXp  with  
2 1
2
( ) S
S MAX
v v X C
p v p
N X
 
  

    (3) 
Clearly, condition (3) is only restrictive if procedural takeover costs SC  are high or if there 
is little or no added value of complete control ( 2 1v v ). In these cases, it may be overly 
costly to buy out the remaining shareholders and the squeeze-out is not credible. Given 
                                                 
16 Lower offers ( S MINP P ) fail to rule out costly shareholder litigation, even though the squeeze-out itself 
may be credible. We will show later that if shareholders can expect to increase profits from holding out (and 
litigating), then the free-riding problem reoccurs, and takeovers may not be successful at stage 2. 
17 The British fee-shifting rule (‘the winner takes all’) would increase the effective settlement payment by L. 
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these considerations, the Buyer sets a credible and profit-maximizing squeeze-out price Sp  
with S MIN MAXp p p   and litigation is avoided with certainty.  
 At stage 2, shareholders accept or reject the tender price offer Tp . In the following, 
we only focus on tender prices in the range 0 1Tv p v  . It is easy to see that lower tender 
prices will never succeed, and higher tender prices will typically lead to a successful but 
very costly takeover.18 We call it a free-rider-problem in the tradition of GROSSMAN and 
HART (1980), if each individual shareholder is better off holding out when takeover success 
is expected with certainty. In our model, the decision to tender is a (weakly) dominant 
strategy for shareholders if and only if the tender price is never below the expected squeeze-
out price, ( )T Sp E p ,19 and squeeze-outs are credible: if shareholders expect a successful 
takeover, holding out and rejecting the offer does not lead to an expected payment higher 
than Tp . If shareholders expect the takeover to fail, accepting the tender offer is always 
better than holding out and being stuck with 0v . Thus, squeeze-out procedures in our game 
allow a (weak) Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies where all shareholders tender, and the 
takeover occurs with certainty.20  
                                                 
18 Note that costless price fairness procedures in pro-shareholder courts may even require tender offers above 
the post-takeover value. 
19 GOMES (2012) demonstrates that ‘coercive’ offers, i.e. offers where the squeeze-out price is below the tender 
offer price, are ineffectual because arbitrage traders can accumulate enough shares to prevent the buyer from 
reaching the squeeze-out threshold.  
20 Without squeeze-outs, only equilibria in mixed strategies exist, and takeover success is not certain. 
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The free-rider-problem is restored, however, if the tender price is below the 
expected outcome of a squeeze-out, ( )T Sp E p . Then, shareholders who expect a 
successful takeover are better off rejecting the offer and waiting for the squeeze-out 
payment (and possible court appraisal). In this case, there is no Nash-equilibrium in pure 
strategies. Equilibria in mixed strategies exist and takeovers still occur with positive 
probability (see proposition 2).  
At stage 1, the Buyer decides whether to take over the target firm. If he decides to 
make a bid, he chooses the tender price that maximizes his expected profits. The Buyer will 
bid for the target if the following condition holds 
1
2 ( ) 0B T S S BV Xp N X p C C           (4). 
Given (4) holds, any price scheme with ( )T Sp E p  achieves the takeover. Lower tender 
offers restore the free-rider-problem and create the risk of failure, and higher tender offers 
only increase takeover costs. We summarize: 
Proposition 1. (i) Any tender offer that fulfils T S MIN MAXp p p p    ensures a 
complete takeover with certainty. (ii) This tender price is the profit-maximizing 
offer from the Buyer to achieve the takeover with certainty.  
In order to achieve a certain takeover of the target, the buyer chooses the price 
scheme T S MINp p p  . Using (2) and (4), a takeover will be profitable if 
2 1
(1 )
0
1
T
S B
r L
V v N C C

 
     
 
. We find that socially desirable takeovers will thus be 
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executed under squeeze-out litigation if 2 1
(1 )
1
T
S B
r N
V L V C C


    

 holds. It is 
straightforward that efficient takeovers are more likely to occur even under shareholder 
litigation if the private value of complete control over the target is high for the Buyer. In 
addition, sizeable costs of litigation, lengthy court procedures or lower transaction costs are 
disadvantageous for shareholders and allow the favorable takeover. Low litigation fees for 
shareholders and pro-shareholder courts, however, may turn some efficient takeovers not 
profitable for the buyer, and potentially produce an inefficiency.21 Without an added value 
of complete control ( 2 1v v ), complete takeovers will then be undesirable for the Buyer.  
Buyers may increase their profits in a takeover if they are willing to accept potential 
failure in the tendering phase. We call this the gambling offer. In this case, buyers tolerate 
the free-riding problem of shareholders in order to reduce takeover costs, and gamble that 
a lower bid, T Sp p , will still be successful. For an equilibrium in mixed strategies, all 
shareholders must be indifferent between tendering and holding out. We concentrate on 
the focal solution where all shareholders tender with probability t with 0 1t  , and 
takeovers occur with probability P(t). Thus, t must satisfy 
    01 ( ) ( ) 0T S TP t p v P t p p     . Solved for P(t), takeovers occur with probability 
0
0
( ) T
S
p v
P t
p v



, and 0 ( ) 1P t   holds for T Sp p . Any reduction of the tender offer Tp  
                                                 
21 The buyer may still become the majority shareholder of the target, and thereby increase its efficiency. 
However, without squeeze-outs, the free-riding-problem unfolds and takeovers occur with a probability 
lower than one. 
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below the squeeze-out price Sp  will thereby also reduce the probability of success. We thus 
have the following proposition: 
Proposition 2. For any tender offer min maxT Sp p p p   , takeovers occur with a 
probability less than one.  
So far, our results demonstrate that squeeze-out litigation (i.e. price fairness 
procedures) primarily induces some redistribution of social gains to shareholders, as 
intended by shareholder protection laws. From this perspective, the risk of litigation 
induces higher (tender) offers to avoid free-riding shareholders. This restricts the 
occurrence of some efficient takeovers, and thus potentially produces an allocative 
inefficiency. However, we find that squeeze-out litigation does not restore the free-riding 
problem per se (in contrast to MUELLER and PANUNZI 2004, p. 25; BURKART and LEE 2018, 
p. 20): Buyers may choose bids below the post-takeover value and successfully make 
tendering the (weakly) dominant strategy of shareholders. In other words, we demonstrate 
that the underlying incentive compatibility mechanism of squeeze-out procedures is not 
destroyed by litigation, and allows for certain success. The common observation that some 
takeovers actually fail can be well explained, however, as maximizing buyers are tempted 
to tolerate some free-riding in order to further increase profits. Given that the redistribution 
of takeover gains is not desirable to buyers, we would c.p. expect more gambling offers and 
a higher risk of failure when shareholder protection rights are expanded by legislators. 
From an efficiency perspective, a more serious constraint to takeovers than litigation 
(“the legal risk”) is the application of different thresholds for majority control and initiating 
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squeeze-out procedures: if, for example, a raider may assume effective control of a 
corporation when he collects more than fifty percent of the shares, but squeeze-out laws 
require a ninety percent majority, the free-rider-problem manifests again.  
Proposition 3. For two distinct legal thresholds for the ratio of acquired shares, k1 
(for takeovers) and k2 (for squeeze-outs), with k2 > k1, any tender offer 1Tp v  
implies (i) that takeovers fail with a positive probability and (ii) that the risk of 
failure increases in the gap between k1 and k2. 
In this two-threshold scenario, shareholders have an incentive to holdout if they 
believe that enough shares are tendered for the takeover to be successful but still not enough 
for the squeeze-out, in line with prior results of DALKIR et al. (2018). As a consequence, 
there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies for any takeover offer that is below the post-
takeover firm value, and efficient takeovers always occur with a probability smaller than 
one.22 In other words, while the introduction of squeeze-out procedures helps to overcome 
the free-riding problem in takeovers, the use of two different thresholds at least partly 
restores it. The more restrictive the legislator is on the requirements for a squeeze-out, i.e. 
the more unlikely it is that the result of the tendering process meets these criteria, the lower 
is the desirable incentive effect of squeeze-outs on tendering shareholders in the mixed 
strategy equilibrium. 
  
                                                 
22 Such restrictive squeeze-out laws are still preferable to laws which generally prohibit squeeze-outs. This 
case is analyzed in the Annex A2. 
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5. JUDICIAL FAIRNESS REVIEW AND UNCERTAIN STOCK PRICES 
5.1 Stock Prices as Judicial Proxy 
So far, we assumed a complete information setup where courts know the true value of the 
target when verifying the fairness of a squeeze-out payment. In the following, we turn to 
the more realistic case when courts only observe the volatile stock market price and attempt 
to infer the true firm value. For this, courts typically impose a reference period during 
takeovers and take the average share price of that period. Exemplified by the fundamental 
change in jurisdiction of the German Federal Court in 2010, we explicitly study the 
economic impact of different judicial proxies. 
Let the target be a listed firm. We apply the well-established efficient market 
hypothesis (see SAMUELSON 1965, FAMA 1970, RUBINSTEIN 2001, MALKIEL 2005, and YEN and 
LEE 2008) to describe the development of the target´s share price at the stock market. Before 
the takeover at stage 1, the share price z  equals the ex-ante firm value, 1 0z v . At stage 4, 
the share price equals the post-takeover value 
4,
1
TOz v  if the takeover was successful, and 
0
Fz v  in case of a failure. In between, we stylize the share price as a random variable with 
Z  if the market believes in the success of the takeover, and specify 0z v  otherwise. For 
simplicity, assume that there are only three realizations of the share price Z : it can be 
higher, lower or equal to the true post takeover value.23 We specify that 1Z v  occurs with 
                                                 
23 One could also image that stock price is normally distributed with mean value v1. Even though the results 
are qualitatively similar, this complicates the analysis. Thus, we apply the described simplification. 
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probability (1 ) . The higher stock price z , with 1z v d  , and the lower stock price z , 
with 1z v d  , are equidistant from 1v  and are realized with symmetric probability 
2
 . Thus, 
d can be interpreted as the average deviation from the expectancy value, and 1( )E Z v  
applies. We assume that all this is known to the informed parties of the takeover, the Buyer 
and the target´s shareholders. Only the court, as the external enforcement agency, does not 
know the true firm value, but observes the stock market price.  
5.2 Reference Period after the Squeeze-out Announcement  
In this scenario, the court will observe the realization of the share value after the squeeze-
out price is set by the Buyer at stage 3.24 Given the success of the takeover and the squeeze-
out, the decision to litigate by minority shareholders is then also based on the observed 
realization of the stock price Z . For example, when the high stock price z  is realized, then 
minority shareholders can expect to extract from court procedures
 
 14 (1 ) ( )|
(1 )
SL
S S T
v d p
E z p L
r
 

  
  

. In order to evade costly litigation and 
legal uncertainty, the Buyer should clearly offer 
4L
S Sp   as before.  
As the Buyer has to set the squeeze-out price before the realization of Z  is observed, 
he is unable to rule out shareholder litigation without increasing the payout price Sp . More 
specifically, the previously minimum payout offer (2) will prove insufficient whenever 
                                                 
24 This broadly reflects the earlier German jurisdiction of a reference period of three months before the day 
of the shareholder resolution that approves the squeeze-out (see above Chapter 3). 
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Z z  is observed and lead to costly shareholder litigation with probability 
2
 . Any higher 
payout price increases takeover costs due to the increased payment. Any lower payout price 
increases takeover costs due to increased litigation. Furthermore, any payment that falls 
short of the high stock price,
(1 )
1
T
S
r L
p z


 

, effectively restores the free-riding 
dilemma. Then holding out and waiting for the realization of Z  is preferable to tendering 
for shareholders if the takeover is deemed certain.  
Consequently, a judicial routine that refers to the development of the stock price 
after the squeeze-out announcement of the Buyer incentivizes shareholders to wait for the 
realization of the stock price.25 Such procedures increase c.p. the risk of a failed takeover or 
require higher payout offers from the Buyer. Marginal takeovers are potentially discouraged 
under this judicial regime. Note that the inefficiency is caused only by the information 
disadvantage of the Buyer about the enforced stock price by courts.  
 Our findings suggest that the change in jurisdiction of the German Federal Court in 
2010 had a sizeable and positive economic impact on corporate takeovers. Since then, the 
court has applied a judicial decision rule that uses a time period prior to the squeeze-out 
announcement as a reference period for assessing the true stock value. Such a rule imposes 
no additional restrictions on takeovers and thus does not reduce allocative efficiency and 
incentive compatibility. Under this rule, both decision-makers, the Buyer and shareholders, 
                                                 
25 Note that we derive this finding under the assumption of efficient financial markets. The incentive to 
holdout may be even higher if shareholders engage in strategic trading to further increase the stock price. 
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have symmetric information about the potential reference price of the court when it comes 
to squeeze-out procedures.  
6. DISCUSSION  
Our results support the basic notion of, among others, YARROW (1985), AMIHUD et al. 
(2003), and BURKART and PANUNZI (2003) that squeeze-out rules can resolve the free-rider 
problem. Unlike the works of YARROW (1985) and BURKART and PANUNZI (2003), which 
rely on uncontested takeovers, our model more realistically allows for shareholders to 
challenge the squeeze-out in court. We show that, if the courts are not pro-buyer oriented, 
the feasibility of a takeover crucially depends on the shareholders’ litigation cost and the 
buyer’s efficiency gains from complete control. Whereas AMIHUD et al. (2003) also consider 
basic shareholder remedies, they do not contemplate the consequences of litigation cost and 
court-awarded payments above the pre-bid share price. Furthermore, in contrast to AMIHUD 
et al. our results more plausibly do not imply takeover premiums of zero. 
 The perception that shareholder protection laws and litigation routinely restore or 
intensify the free-rider problem (e.g., MUELLER and PANUNZI 2004, BURKART and LEE 2018) 
is not supported in our setting. In MUELLER and PANUNZI (2004) shareholders hold out in a 
tender offer because even the slightest chance of a price mark-up by the courts in a squeeze-
out is preferable to the (certain) original tender price. Importantly, MUELLER and PANUNZI 
do not consider shareholders’ litigation cost, shareholders’ time preferences, and the buyer’s 
potential efficiency gains from complete control. They also do not take into account that, 
in practice, most court proceedings are ended early by settlement. Collectively, these factors 
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reduce the value of litigation for shareholders and increase the attractiveness of a squeeze-
out for buyers, thus allowing for more profitable takeovers. BURKART and LEE (2018) point 
out that the outcome described by MUELLER and PANUNZI is intensified, if the value 
improvement of the target firm grows with the buyer’s ultimate stake and the court awards 
the post squeeze-out value to shareholders. Indeed, such judicial ruling would also be 
harmful to takeovers in our setting (although not eliminating all profitable takeovers), 
highlighting the importance of law and jurisdiction. 
 Finally, our findings support the views of GOMES (2012) and DALKIR et al. (2018) that 
higher squeeze-out thresholds are harmful to takeovers. Whereas GOMES bases his results 
on the increased bargaining power of arbitrageurs with higher thresholds and DALKIR et al. 
establish their results in a non-atomistic model where shareholders can be pivotal for the 
takeover, we can confirm the outcome in a setting with atomistic shareholders and no 
arbitrage. We also corroborate the assertion by DALKIR et al. that dual thresholds for control 
and squeeze-outs are detrimental to takeovers and show that the problem increases in the 
gap between the two thresholds.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
Squeeze-out procedures are a widespread legal institution to overcome the free-riding 
problem of takeovers. In order to protect the financial interest of minority shareholders and 
to balance the distribution of takeover gains, legislators deem it necessary to enact 
subsequent shareholder protection laws. Although extensive shareholder litigation can be 
observed to follow squeeze-outs in many countries, it remains unclear whether this is the 
result of a basic conflict between the efficiency of squeeze-outs and shareholder protection 
laws or whether other factors actually restore the free-riding dilemma. This paper addresses 
these questions. 
We apply a sequential takeover game with a potential buyer and atomistic 
shareholders of a target firm. After a tender phase, the buyer may announce squeeze-out 
procedures and, in exchange for a compensation payment, force all remaining shareholders 
out of the target. Given shareholder protection laws, shareholders may then legally 
challenge the fairness of this payout price and seek a review by the court. Applying 
backward induction, we find that a rational buyer will usually be able to implement a price 
offer below the post-takeover stock value that achieves a successful takeover with certainty. 
Despite the risk of litigation, the buyer is able to acquire some part of the takeover gains. 
While a judicial price fairness review clearly increases the price offer above the pre-
takeover stock value, thus making the takeover costlier to the buyer, it does not restore the 
free-riding problem: an equilibrium in pure strategies exists where the buyer offers the 
expected outcome of litigation to shareholders, and all shareholders tender. In other words, 
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the risk of shareholder litigation requires higher (tender) offers to incentivize tendering and 
thus avoid the free-riding problem. Lengthy court procedures and a high time preference 
of shareholders work in favor of the buyer and reduce required payments, while pro-
shareholder courts imply higher takeover costs. While the effects of shareholder litigation 
are thus mainly redistributive, some allocative inefficiency is induced for takeovers with 
marginal gains, as they may no longer be desirable for buyers. 
 Even though shareholder litigation does not contradict the incentive compatibility 
mechanism of squeeze-outs, several considerations may explain the common observation of 
litigation and takeover failure. 
 First, profit-maximizing buyers will often tolerate a limited degree of free-riding 
behavior and thus accept a certain probability of failure, as they decrease their tender offer 
below the later payout price. In this regard, rational buyers gamble as they trade the 
increased risk of failure against the lower takeover costs through the tendering phase. This 
is a strategic reaction of buyers to the redistribution of takeover gains as desired by 
lawmakers. Such gambling is expected to increase with the level of shareholder protection. 
 Second, the existence of relevant litigation costs to shareholders enables buyers to 
limit the costly increase in takeover premiums in order to incentivize tendering. Given the 
potential costs of litigation and the risk of losing in court, shareholders will be willing to 
accept some reduction in the offered payout price. Particularly in pro-shareholder courts, 
buyers can only succeed at paying below post-takeover stock prices when litigation costs 
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are sizeable. Any legislation that reduces litigation costs for shareholders makes takeovers 
less favorable to buyers, gives rise to fraudulent lawsuits and eventually induces gambling. 
 Third, the existence of two different legal thresholds for corporate control and the 
feasibility of squeeze-out procedures effectively restores the free-riding dilemma. In this 
case, shareholders may speculate that the takeover succeeds without meeting the higher 
threshold of the squeeze-out which would make holding out the dominant strategy. 
Consequently, the more rigid the threshold for squeeze-outs is, the stronger the free-riding 
problem resurfaces. As the use of two distinct thresholds is particularly widespread in 
European takeover laws, this creates a major inefficiency in squeeze-out procedures. Given 
that shareholder protection and redistribution is still enforced by courts, lawmakers should 
consider applying a one-threshold approach. 
 Forth, an additional limitation lies in the judicial evaluation of the firm value. Such 
an evaluation often uses stock prices as a reference for the fair value, but significant 
fluctuations during takeovers create uncertainty to buyers. Exemplified by the change in 
jurisdiction of the German Federal Court, it appears reasonable that courts apply a reference 
period of the firm´s stock price that ends prior to the announcement of the squeeze-out 
decision. Otherwise, the buyer has an informational disadvantage when defining the payout 
price and this would cause either higher takeover costs or a higher probability of failure. 
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8. ANNEX 
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 
(i) A certain takeover requires that there is no free-riding problem. First, a price MAXp p  
ensures that the squeeze-out is credible. Second, the price MINp p  is the lowest price that 
rules out litigation. Any lower price will incentivize shareholders to holdout and legally 
challenge the ‘fairness’ of the payment, which puts the takeover at risk. Third, any price 
that suffices T Sp p  makes tendering at least as preferable for shareholders as holding out. 
Only then, tendering is the pure strategy equilibrium. (ii) Consider an alternative price 
scheme  ;T S S MAXp p p p p    with 0p  . Again, this price set achieves a certain 
takeover. However, incentive compatibility only requires the condition T Sp p  to be 
binding. Thus, takeover costs are higher by pX . For any 0p  , tendering is no more a 
dominant shareholder strategy and takeovers fail with positive probability. ■ 
A2. Proof of Proposition 3. 
Assume two legal thresholds, k1 and k2: the threshold k1 defines the ratio of shares required 
for obtaining majority control of a firm. Threshold k2 defines the required ratio of shares 
for starting squeeze-out procedures, with k2 > k1. For simplicity, the Buyer makes the offer 
T Sp p . There is no equilibrium in pure strategies: Given that a shareholder expects 
2 1k k k  , that is, the takeover is successful but a squeeze-out is not possible, it is best not 
to tender. For expectations of 1k k , tender is preferable as the takeover is expected to fail. 
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For 2k k , the decision to tender is irrelevant for shareholder payoffs. For an equilibrium 
in mixed strategies, shareholders must be indifferent between tendering and holding out. 
We concentrate on the focal solution and assume that all shareholders tender with 
probability t. Let ( , , )F x y z  be the Binomial distribution function with x trials, probability 
of success y, and no more of z trials to be successful, then the probability of a successful 
takeover can be determined by 
1
1 1
!
( ) 1 ( , , 1) (1 )
!( )!
N j N j
j k N
N
P t F N t k N t t
j N j


    

  
. Trivially, 2 2 1( ) 1 ( , , 1) ( )P t F N t k N P t     holds, which implies that a takeover is 
strictly more likely than a takeover with a subsequent squeeze-out. Shareholders are 
indifferent if the gains of holding out equal the loss of tendering,
   1 0 1 2 11 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0T TP t p v P t P t v p      . Solving for the probability of a 
takeover, we find 
0 2 1
1
1 0
( )( )
( ) 1T T
p v P t v p
P t
v v
  
 

 . We know that P1(t) and 
P2(t) increase monotonically in the interval (0,1). This implies that the existence of squeeze-
out procedures increases the probability of a takeover for any P2 > 0. However, the higher 
c.p. the legal threshold for squeeze-out procedures, k2, the lower P2 and the lower the 
positive impact on the probability of successful takeovers. Note that this result equals the 
solution of BEBCHUCK (1989, p. 175) for the case P2 = 0. If k1=k2, then P1=P2. Thus, tendering 
is the dominant strategy and takeovers are always successful, P(t)=1. Also, for the case PT = 
v1, no free-riding problem exists and takeovers occur with certainty. ■ 
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A3. Action of Avoidance. 
If the Squeeze-Out is annulled, minority shareholders receive the post-takeover value 1v , 
otherwise they receive the pay-out price pS at the end of litigation procedures. In contrast 
to appraisal procedures, payments are distributed only at the end of litigation. At stage 4, 
the litigating shareholder thus expects the payment 
4 1(1 )
(1 )
L S
S T
p v
L
r
 

 
 

. 
Consequently, the minimum payout offer that avoids litigation is 
1(1 ) (1 )
(1 )
T
Avoidance
S MINT
v r L
p p
r


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 
 
. Analogously, any price scheme 
Avoidance
T S MIN MAXp p p p    ensures a certain takeover. 
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